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UCC. If it is, it will have a four-year period; if it is not, it will
have the six-year period provided by the CPLR.
ARTICLE 3-JtURISDICTION AN) SERvIcE, APPEARANCE
AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a): Amendment.
The revisers of the CPLR have amended section 302(a) to
include a new subsection (3), which provides that the New York
courts will have in personam jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary
defendant who
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or
property within the state... if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantidl revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences
in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international
commerce. [Emphasis added.]
Prior to the enactment of CPLR 302, a liberal trend was
noticeable among those United States Supreme Court decisions
which concerned the constitutionality of "long-arm" statutes.17 The
requirement of physical presence within a state gave way to the
notion that a non-domiciliary who committed certain acts within
the state would be subject to in personam jurisdiction if the
imposition of jurisdiction did not offend "our traditional conception
of fair play and substantial justice... .' In International Shoe
Co. v. Washington,"9 this was interpreted to mean that due process
required a defendant to have certain "minimum contacts" before
a state could exercise in personam jurisdiction.
In 1965, the New York Court of Appeals had the opportunity,
for the first time, to interpret its own "long-arn" statute. Before
it, as a guide, was the liberal decision of the Supreme Court of
Illinois in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.20
In that case, an Ohio manufacturer was said to come within the
purview of the Illinois "tortious act" jurisdictional statute when
a valve he had manufactured in Ohio caused injury in Illinois.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that there could be no distinction
between the negligent act of manufacturing and the consequences
17 See Hanson v. Dendda, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Is International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
19 Supra. note 17.
2022 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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caused thereby. Since the New York statute was practically
identical with the Illinois provisions interpreted in Gray, it would
have been reasonable for the New York courts to follow the
Illinois interpretation. Yet, in Feathers v. McLuca,21 the Court
of Appeals held that New York lacked jurisdiction where defend-
ant's product, negligently manufactured outside New York, caused
injury here. The Court distinguished a tortious act from the
consequences of that act. Therefore, since CPLR 302 (a) (2)
covered only a tortious act committed in this state, there was no
basis for the assertion of jurisdiction.
It appears that the intent of the revisers in adding new sub-
division (3) to CPLR 302(a) was to overcome the Feathers
case and to bring within the jurisdictional reach of New York
those non-domiciliaries whose tortious acts outside the state cause
injury in New York (provided that either of two conditions,
subparagraphs (i) or (ii), are met).
The first condition, (i), appears to require a regular course
of conduct in the state. The second condition, (ii), requires that
the defendant reasonably expect his act to have forum consequences
and that he derive substantial revenue from interstate or inter-
national commerce. There is, however, no requirement that the
tortious act committed outside the state be connected with the
acts specified in subparagraphs (i) and (ii),22 except that the
cause of action must arise out of the act foreseen under subpara-
graph (ii). 23
It should be noted that, in its recommendations on this amend-
ment, the Judicial Conference assumed that it would be constitu-
tional to exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who could
have foreseen that his act would have consequences within the
state and who had other contacts with the state.24 The question
for the Conference was whether New York, as a matter of policy,
should extend its jurisdiction to these constitutional limits. This
problem is made clearer by a hypothetical: X, a New York
domiciliary with New York license plates on his automobile, buys
a tire from a small retailer in Nebraska and injury occurs in New
York when the tire explodes. It is reasonable to assume that the
211 5 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). See also
Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
22 In International Shoe, the cause of action arose out of the minimum
contacts. While CPLR 302(a) (3) (i) requires minimum contacts-regular
business, persistent course of conduct or substantial revenue-the cause of
action need not arise therefrom.
2s It would appear that under the facts of Feathers, the requirement that
the defendant should have foreseen the forum consequences of his act would
be satisfied.
24 1966 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 90, ELmvENln ANNUAL REPORT OF TE
JUDIcIAL CoNFERENcE 132, 135-36.
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local retailer could foresee New York consequences due to a defect
in the tire. The Conference concluded that New York would
have power under the federal constitution to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the retailer, but, as a matter of policy, it would
be undesirable to do so.25 Yet, if the retailer were a large
corporation with extensive contacts in New York, or did extensive
business in interstate commerce, the Conference believed that it
would be fair (and constitutional) to exercise jurisdiction.
It would seem that in the case of the local Nebraska retailer,
the court could not exercise jurisdiction because of a lack of
"minimum contacts," as that term has been earlier defined. The
additional factor that the retailer was doing business in interstate
or international commerce (CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii)) would not seem
to change the situation.
However, neither the CPLR Committee of the Judicial Con-
ference, the Conference itself, nor the legislature was unaware of
these problems of potential unconstitutionality. But the absence
of clear United States Supreme Court guidelines made it necessary
-in view of the general legislative intent to expand jurisdictional
bases in the amended 302-to step forward with an approach
which would realize the intent while at the same time would honor
constitutional requirements whose limits have yet to be authorita-
tively defined. The dividing line is hazy, for which reason the
amendment may in certain cases go beyond it, and thus fail of
its purpose. But it will fail only in the individual case. CPLR
10004 will see to it that it does not fail in its entirety. The
amendment is, in short, an invitation to the courts to press the
long-arm tort sphere to whatever limits they think the United
States Supreme Court will accept.
CPLR 302(a)(1): New York default judgment collaterally
attacked in New Jersey.
In J. W. Sparks & Co. v. Gallos,26 a New York stock
brokerage firm brought an action in New Jersey to enforce a New
York default judgment. The defendant collaterally attacked the
jurisdiction of the New York court. Jurisdiction over the defendant
in the original action had been acquired under Section 404, the
long-arm provision of the New York City Civil Court Act.2 7
This case is one of the first recorded decisions of a foreign
forum faced with a default judgment under New York's long-arm
statute. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that although
25 Id. at 136.
26 47 N.J. 295, 220 A.2d 673 (1966).
27 This section is the New York City Civil Court Act's counterpart of
CPLR 302.
